White Paper: Opportunism and Polarisation

‘Presentations of the violence in Israel and Palestine by Aotearoa disinformation networks’

In November 2023, The Disinformation Project released a White Paper which captured themes within Aotearoa New Zealand’s disinformation ecologies related to violence and conflict in Palestine and Israel between 7-23 October.

This is a time-bound snapshot of data, including footage from Israel and Palestine, and an analysis in near-real time of its impact within existing disinformation communities that initially formed around COVID-19 denial and minimisation.

Distribution of the White Paper was initially limited to communities, civil society organisations and relevant agencies, however, the final iteration is now published for wider use.

Key findings include:

  • Telegram is a major hub for sharing propaganda, graphic content and disinformation from pro-Hamas and pro-Israeli perspectives. Telegram channels and groups form echo chambers which reinforce biased narratives.

  • Pro-Hamas accounts are very active on Telegram, operating channels and groups that spread graphic violent content, propaganda, and disinformation portraying Palestinians as victims and justifying Hamas' actions. These accounts helped form echo chambers reinforcing anti-Israel, and extremely violent antisemitic narratives, expressed in written, memetic, visual, and video forms.

  • Pro-Israel accounts also used Telegram to share their biased perspectives, propaganda and misleading claims, depicting all Palestinians as terrorists and justifying Israeli military actions.

  • Twitter/X facilitates heated, polarising debates on the conflict with rigid ideological positions forming. Highly viral misleading claims and conspiracy theories spread rapidly on Twitter.

  • ‘Narrative flattening’, seen through the deliberate misrepresentations of varied, fluid, and complex opinions on the outbreak of war as being partial to, excusing or promoting terrorism resulted in chilling effects, as well as the heightened, networked, and violent targeting of individuals and institutions.

  • Swarms of enraged accounts, especially on Twitter/X, engaged in flame wars spanning multiple geographies, media, and in some cases, even languages (featuring Arabic, English, Hindi, and Hebrew in the replies, and quotes).

  • On Twitter, pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli accounts engaged in heated debates and ideological polarization around the conflict. They spread viral misinformation and conspiracy theories demonising the other side.

  • Domestic verified/Blue check accounts on Twitter/X amplified some of the misleading narratives, despite presenting an air of credibility. Certain influential accounts emerged as key nodes for cross-platform sharing of deliberately provocative, misleading, untrue or partially true content.

  • Conspiracy websites, alternative, far-right web-based platforms, and related online communities helped propagate anti-establishment narratives on the war, aligned with Russian propaganda frames, by exploiting (and adding to the perceptions of) distrust in liberal democratic institutions, and mainstream media.

  • Strong in-group, and out-group divisions were evident across platforms, and media, with each side depicting the other as evil, through narratives which lacked any nuance.

  • Extensive cross-platform linking, and sharing of provocative content between Telegram, Twitter, YouTube, conspiratorial websites etc., enabling rapid dissemination within, and across online ecosystems.

Read the full paper.

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